On Tuesday, the foreign ministers of the US, Japan, India and Australia held the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington. Just a day earlier, the coast guards of the four nations launched the first-ever “Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission.” According to Indian media reports, the mission was initiated under the 2024 Wilmington Declaration to “improve interoperability and advance maritime safety, and continue with further missions in future years across the Indo-Pacific.” However, in essence, the latest joint coast guard patrol is yet another move in the US strategic playbook for the region.
According to reports, maritime law enforcement personnel from Japan, Australia and India boarded the US Coast Guard Cutter Stratton to conduct joint patrols and training in the Western Pacific waters between Palau and Guam. Chen Hong, a professor and director of the Australian Studies Centre at East China Normal University, told the Global times that this stretch of water lies between the first and second island chains and serves as a traditional US “strategic buffer zone.” The patrol was led by the US, with Japan, Australia and India contributing personnel aboard – clearly demonstrating that this exercise was more an extension of US enforcement authority than a truly equal partnership, Chen noted. Song Zhongping, a Chinese military affairs expert, warned that in the future, the four countries may intervene more frequently in regional issues through joint patrols, using them as a pretext on matters involving China.
On Tuesday, the Quad foreign ministers issued a joint statement announcing the establishment of “the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative” and expressing “serious concerns regarding dangerous and provocative actions” in the South and East China Seas – remarks interpreted by foreign media as directed at China. Chen stated that within the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” the Quad is viewed as a key mechanism for establishing a regional containment framework intended to limit China’s peaceful development. However, for the other three Quad members – Japan, Australia, and India – the Quad functions more as a diplomatic tool to enhance their influence in regional affairs rather than being entirely subordinate to Washington’s strategic agenda.
In reality, among the four countries, which one – including the US – does not have its own national interests to consider when facing China? Take Australia, for example: China is a strategically important market in the Asia-Pacific region for many Australian companies, and investments in the Chinese market are steadily increasing. China has been Australia’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years. According to the latest Lowy Institute poll, more Australians now view China as “an economic partner” rather than “a security threat.”
Since the new US government came to power, it has consistently undermined and weakened the multilateral order – prioritizing “America First” and instrumentalizing its allies. As a result, distrust among traditional partners has deepened. Japan, Australia and India – all US allies within this grouping – have not been spared from Washington’s imposition of reciprocal tariffs. The US government has repeatedly pressed its Asia-Pacific allies to ramp up defense spending. In June, after Washington urged Japan to raise its defense budget to 3.5 percent of GDP, Tokyo responded by scrapping the annual “two-plus-two” security talks with the US. Although the US has pushed for increased defense spending, the Australian government has insisted that its current plan already represents “the single biggest peacetime increase in defense expenditure in Australia’s history.” No wonder prior to the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting, a Reuters report put it plainly: “Bilateral frictions to overshadow Rubio meeting with Indo-Pacific partners.”
The absence of Japan’s and Australia’s leaders from the NATO summit was undoubtedly symbolic, signaling that they’re not prepared to foot the bill for the US global strategy. Similarly, the Quad is evolving; what was once a cornerstone of the “Indo-Pacific strategy” is increasingly transforming into a “platform for diplomacy,” conveying more symbolic significance than practical utility.
In the face of a complex and evolving “Indo-Pacific” landscape as well as a condescending US, the internal divisions within the Quad and the fragility of US alliance relationships are bound to become more evident. GT
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